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Abstract 
Military conflict in South-Eastern Ukraine is an example of “hybrid warfare” in 
which “war for minds” is one of the key elements. Differences of Ukrainian 
people geopolitical orientations often are explained with respect to the region of 
residence, ethnic identity and native language. Previous research on the problem 
has three types of limitations: scale, dependent variable (orientations), and 
regional structures. This study aims to challenge the “on surface” view of place 
of residence as the key predictor of geopolitical attitudes in Ukraine. The author 
used excessive amount of data (2005-2015 period surveys with 378,733 cases 
total sample) and several combinations of dependent variables to test the effects 
of attitude types, changing political situation and social environment in the 
regions. The results of regression modeling shows that regional structure is more 
powerful in explaining general attitude to Russia than integration intentions. 
Regional differences proved to be partially explained with the level of lingual-
ethnic heterogeneity. In general it seems that language environment has more 
influence than ethnic. Religious identification also remains very powerful and 
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significant. It is claimed that cultural domain of social environment is the key to 
explain regional structure of geopolitical orientations in Ukraine. 
Keywords: geopolitical orientations, regional cleavages, Ukraine-Russia conflict, 
lingual-ethnic heterogeneity, ethnic identity 
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Since the USSR collapse, the Black Sea region, in which Ukraine is one of the central 
powers, has become in many ways important for European security. First, the main energy 
corridors—gas and oil pipes—are controlled by the states of the region. Second, there 
were always several “frozen” conflicts in the region which are sources not only of warfare 
danger (most frequently — Caucasus), but also of crime and humanitarian problems: 
smuggling, drugs, weapon and human trafficking. Third, ethnic tensions in the region 
cause spreading of Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism and other forms of extremism not 
only throughout Black Sea countries, but at the global level. The fourth factor is the 
controversial geopolitical position of Russia, which has not only economic and political, 
but also territorial ambitions. Fifth, the region is essentially trans-boundary: several blocks 
and military organizations (NATO and CSTO1 among the main) have their troops ready 
for ground and sea actions. Therefore, almost all main world powers (including USA, 
European Union, and Russia) have certain levels of engagement in the regional processes. 
 
                                                          
1 The Collective Security Treaty Organization. Russia-centered military block. 
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All these factors had made the military conflict in Ukraine highly possible, however 
not expected by many analysts in the near future (Larrabee, 2015, p. 41). The view of 
Europe as a strategically stable continent has proved to be too optimistic. As a result of 
the Euromaidan revolution in Ukraine, president Yanukovych was overthrown and sought 
protection in Russia. The change of Ukrainian authorities extremely reduced the chances 
of Kremlin to gain control over it via political means. This crisis became a trigger for 
Russia to act more openly in order to realize its geopolitical aspirations. During March and 
April 2014 in the Eastern and Southern regions, several propaganda campaigns were 
organized to separate these regions from Ukraine (Ofcom., 2014; Richter, 2015). After 
informational preparation, military Special Forces took their turn. They succeeded in rapid 
annexation of Crimea, but failed in the Donbas region, which resulted in protracted and a 
slaughterous military crisis. 
The conflict in South-East Ukraine represents a new form of “hybrid warfare” — 
combination of open military actions with undercover special operations, organization and 
support of separatists, pro-Russian paramilitary groups, combined with an aggressive use 
of propaganda and disinformation carefully calculated to avoid crossing established 
thresholds for military response (Hoffman, 2007, p. 18; Larrabee, 2015, p. 22; Bachmann, 
2015). The choice of Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions by Putin’s strategists was not 
accidental. This part of Ukraine was always more pro-Russian oriented than the West-
Northern region. During the Euromaidan unrest in Kyiv, this sentiment became even 
stronger. Still, the critical point of emphasis is that neither of these regions’ public support 
of Ukraine’s incorporation into the Russian state was above 50% of the adult population 
(Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 2014). Therefore without Russian support these 
sentiments would have never turned into actions which put Ukrainian sovereignty into 
question. The key research question of this article is as follows: which social characteristics 
of South-East Ukraine population made it the most suitable target of Russian “war for 
minds”? 
Previous Research 
Taking into account the importance of Ukraine in the European balance of powers, 
mass political attitudes of its population have been among key objects of post-Soviet 
studies (see for instance Kulyk, 2009; Katchanovski, 2008; Lane, 2008; Munro, 2007; 
Shulman, 2001, 2004, 2005, 2006; Barrington and Herron, 2004; Barrington, Herron, and 
Silver, 2003; Barrington, 1997, 2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c; Kubicek, 2000; Holdar, 1995; 
Arel, 1992). Among different social variables taken as explanatory for Ukrainian citizens 
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geopolitical differences three proved to be the most influential: region of residence, ethnic 
identity and native language (Barrington, Faranda, 2009; Smith, 1997; Khmelko, 1998). 
The last census of 2001 showed that the dominant (77.8%) nationality in Ukraine is 
Ukrainian, while 67.5% of those individuals polled named Ukrainian as their native 
language (State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, 2004). However, more careful question 
wording and use of question blocks for lingual-ethnic identification in sociological polls 
of KIIS showed that the population is much more heterogeneous (Khmelko, 2004). KIIS 
polls showed that Russian speakers are more numerous than Ukrainian and that their 
proportion is rather stable (Khmelko & Oksamytna, 2008, p. 2).  
At the same time, lingual-ethnic heterogeneity highly connected with regional 
structure: the percentage of Russophones grows from the West through to the Center and 
from South to East. In turn, regional structure to the most extent defines the distribution 
of geopolitical orientations and as a result — voting preferences (Khmelko & Oksamytna, 
2008, p. 3). The latter tendency became prominent originally during the 1994 presidential 
elections when leading candidates started to manipulate through pro-/anti-Russian 
sentiments (Birch, 1995) — political technology has been used in each campaign for more 
than a decade already (Khmelko, 2006; Frye, 2015). 
While region of residence is the most “on surface” factor of foreign policy 
orientations in Ukraine, there is no consensus among the scholars working in this area of 
studies. The discussion core is of world-old dilemma: chicken or the egg, namely whether 
lingual-ethnic heterogeneity defines regional differences in geopolitical orientations or 
regional structure (which comprise historical background and predominant social 
environment in each region) defines lingual-ethnic heterogeneity and geopolitical 
orientations in turn.  
All previous studies have their limitations which we can summarize in three blocks: 
(1) limitations of scale; (2) limitations of dependent variable (geopolitical orientations) type 
and (3) limitations of regional structures. If we focus on one of the most statistically 
rigorous examples — Barrington and Faranda (2009) — these limitations can be specified 
as follows: 
(1) It is done on the basis of only one survey collected in July 2005 by the Kiev 
International Institute of Sociology. There may be some effects of that time 
political situation, especially after the Orange revolution which sharpened 
regional divisions through pro-West and pro-Russian orientation of two main 
candidates of the 2004 presidential elections in Ukraine. 
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(2) The authors used a specially constructed pro-Russian sentiment index variable, 
which takes into account only the general attitudes to Russia: favorable or 
unfavorable view of Russia, consideration of its role in world politics, positive or 
negative influence on Ukraine. Still, there are more definitive attitudes. For 
instance, the willingness to unite Ukraine and Russia into one state or, at least, 
eliminate customs borders and visa control. Other orientations of these type 
include readiness to vote particularly on referendums about NATO, CSTO and 
other West- or Russia-centered interstate associations. Such orientations are 
more geopolitical per se than merely sentiment to Russia, and thus potentially 
more relevant in explaining the support of changing the geopolitical map of the 
region. 
(3) Regions used as inseparable independent variable. The only use of region 
population characteristics is the interaction of region and lingual-ethnical 
affiliation of each respondent (individual level of analysis). Still, there may be the 
influence of social environment. Each region has its dominant ethnic, lingual, 
and other population categories whose orientations may suppress more marginal 
categories. Thus, the level of these categories’ heterogeneity in each region, which 
is rather a macro than an individual indicator, may define the level of geopolitical 
orientations’ uniformity. 
To test these hypotheses, our analysis consists of two parts: first, we replicated the 
Barrington and Faranda (2009) analysis on different datasets with the use of different types 
of geopolitical orientations measurement as the dependent variables. Second, we included 
an explanatory group of variables which indicated the level of lingual-ethnic heterogeneity 
of the macroregions. 
Data Structure 
The first test was performed with the use of joint 2005-2015 years dataset. The total 
sample combines almost 400,000 cases. The set of dependent and independent variables 
in this array are slightly different than those used by Barrington and Faranda (2009). The 
religion affiliation is coded as pro-Russian (Orthodox – Moscow Patriarchy) believers, 
pro-Ukrainian (Orthodox – Kyiv Patriarchy and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox 
Church combined), pro-Western (Uniate and Roman Catholic Church combined), other 
believers and non-believers. The level of education is coded as incomplete secondary 
education, complete secondary education, special secondary education, and incomplete 
and complete higher education combined (Barrington and Faranda separate these two 
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categories). The locality size is divided only between rural and urban instead of a 6-grade 
scale. Such coding appears to be more explanatory, as Barrington and Faranda (2009, p. 
241) themselves assume only a two-sided contrast: “Ethnic Russians are found more often 
in larger cities, while rural areas tend to be predominantly made up of ethnic Ukrainians.” 
Personal economic standing variable is absent in our joint dataset. However, Barrington 
and Faranda did not find any significant influence of this variable in all regression models 
they calculated. 
Separate attention should be devoted to native language estimation as it is one of the 
key explanatory variables. Barrington and Faranda (2009) used one simple question 
“Which language do you primarily speak at home?” (Ukrainian, Russian, Both Ukrainian 
and Russian, Other) (p. 237). Arel and Khmelko (1996) argued that language behavior (the 
language people actually speak) was a far better indicator than language identity, which 
was reported by respondents. In this study, we used two-step questioning, developed by 
Khmelko (2004, p. 5). The interviewer evaluates the language in which the respondent 
answers to the greeting of “Good Day” pronounced in a way that makes it unclear whether 
he spoke Ukrainian or Russian and then asks whether he or she would prefer to continue 
the interview in Ukrainian or Russian. If the answer is “it does not matter,” it is asked 
which of the two languages the respondent speaks the most. The resulting combined 
variable consists of six values: Ukrainian; Russian; speaks Ukrainian more; doesn’t matter, 
speaks both, answers in Ukrainian; speaks Russian more; doesn’t matter, speaks both, 
answers in Russian. For language effects modeling, it is recoded as “Ukrainian” + “speaks 
Ukrainian more” — Ukrainian, “Russian” + “speaks Russian more” — Russian. Other 
respondents were considered as bilingual. 
Besides the joint dataset, we also used poll results of April 2008. It consists of 2037 
cases and represents public opinion of the later period of the Yushchenko presidency. 
Independent variables of this dataset we used for analysis are totally comparable with 
Barrington’s and Faranda’s (2009) set. (i.e. questions and answers wording are identical). 
We calculated separate regression models for two independent variables in this 
dataset:  
(1)  Answers to the question “What is your general attitude to Russia now?” (very 
good, generally good, generally bad, very bad, hard to say). This question is the 
closest to Barrington’s “general attitude” index. 
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(2)  Answers to the question “Which relations with Russia do you prefer?” (The 
same as with other nations – with closed boundaries, visa and customs control; 
Ukraine and Russia must be independent but friendly states; Ukraine and 
Russia must unite into one state.). The question scale was developed by Valeriy 
Khmelko (2014, p. 4). 
The scales of these variables were recoded with the use of Barrington’s approach to 
constructing the attitude scale, thus the values changed from -10 (pro-Western extreme) 
to +10 (pro-Russian extreme). 
The third dataset included poll results of March 2010. It consisted of 1226 cases and 
represented the Yanukovych presidency. Independent and dependent variables in this 
dataset were identical to April 2008 poll. 
The last dataset is April 2014 poll, which was conducted after Yanukovych resignation and 
just as Russian aggression began. It consists of 2022 cases. The predictors set is identical 
to the previous two polls. We used four types of independent variables in our analysis: 
(1) General attitude to Russia—index variable based on four questions—“What is 
your general attitude to Russia now?”, “What is your general attitude to Russians 
(Russia residents) now?”, “What is your general attitude to Russia authorities 
now?”—the scale of answers to these three is “very good, generally good, 
generally bad, very bad, hard to say”, “Russian society represents essentially 
different values than Ukraine” (completely agree, partially agree, neither agree 
nor disagree, partially disagree, completely disagree). 
(2) Answers to question “Which relations with Russia do you prefer?”—the same as 
in previous datasets.  
(3) Preferable foreign policy direction—index variable based on 2 statements 
evaluation—“Ukraine should tighten the links with Europe, even if it worsen its 
relations with Russia”, “Ukraine should tighten the links with Europe, even if it 
worsen its relations with Russia”. The answers scale includes 5-components: 
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(4) What would you choose on the referendum: Ukraine joining to Customs Union 
with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan or European Union? The question and 
answers set is identical to the same question in joint dataset. 
The level of lingual-ethnic heterogeneity of the macroregions was determined with 
the set of 9 aggregation variables — percentages of lingual-ethnic groups in each region 
identified in the polls results. The ethnic identity was revealed with the use of question 
“How do you identify yourself by nationality?” (Ukrainian, Russian, the list of “other” 
nationalities is provided, but coded as one value). The groups that were considered 
included the following: Ukrainians—those who identify themselves only with Ukrainian 
ethnos, Russians, Ukrainian language speakers, mixed Ukraine-Russian language 2 
speakers, Russian language speakers, Ukrainian language speakers and simultaneously 
Ukrainians, mixed Ukraine-Russian language speakers and simultaneously Ukrainians, 
Russian language speakers and simultaneously Ukrainians, Russian language speakers and 
simultaneously Russians. 
Results 
In total, we calculated 48 ordinary least squares models for the first part of our analysis 
and 49 models calculated for the second part. All dummy variables excluded as 
comparative in the first part are the same or analogous to the Barrington and Faranda 
(2009) approach. In the second part, the set of dummy variables from the first part were 
combined with the scale variables of lingual-ethnic heterogeneity. Presented below are the 
key parts of the regression coefficients tables, which are important for our analysis. The 
whole calculations output, as well as SPSS syntax files of all variables coding and analysis 
are available from the author, upon request. 
The following tables 1-2 include the coefficient estimates and the standard error of 
each of these estimates. Coefficient estimates with a superscript of “***” represent 




                                                          
2 Which is often referred to as “surzhyk” — a range of mixed (macaronic) sociolects of Ukrainian and 
Russian languages. 
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40 to 40)  
Which relations 
with Russia do 
you prefer? 




(from -20 to 
20) 
Customs Union 
with Russia or 
European 
Union? (from -
10 to 10) 










-22.74*** 2.995 -8.07 0.999 -13.54*** 2.033 -9.56*** 1.333 
East region 24.335*** 2.001 5.086 0.669 17.375*** 1.359 11.273*** 0.892 
Eastcentral  11.541*** 1.871 2.677 0.626 11.66*** 1.271 7.729*** 0.833 
South  12.174*** 1.911 1.987** 0.639 11.434*** 1.298 6.592*** 0.853 
Southwest  10.108 1.984 1.527** 0.664 8.3*** 1.347 2.111 0.882 
Northcentral  2.626 1.643 1.354** 0.55 4.88*** 1.115 2.66*** 0.731 
Westcentral  0.585 1.72 0.733 0.575 5.381*** 1.168 1.604 0.767 
Russian 
ethnic identity 
7.993*** 1.229 2.388*** 0.41 4.786*** 0.835 3.014*** 0.549 
Other ethnic 
identity 









6.91*** 1.106 0.644 0.37 4.207*** 0.751 1.8*** 0.495 
Orthodox–
Moscow 
8.472*** 2.063 1.699** 0.69 2.624 1.401 2.116** 0.918 
Orthodox–
Kyiv 





3.437 3.037 2.944** 1.013 -2.949 2.062 -0.106 1.35 
Other 
believer 
8.16*** 1.976 1.565 0.661 1.823 1.342 1.257 0.879 
Non-believer 6.382*** 2.396 1.022 0.801 1.8 1.627 1.928 1.067 
Male 
respondent 
-1.019 0.713 -0.432 0.238 -0.087 0.484 -0.333 0.318 
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Higher 
education 




-3.21 2.802 -1.441 0.934 -5.688*** 1.902 -1.442 1.246 
Special 
secondary 
0.754 2.115 -1.054 0.705 -0.705 1.436 -0.232 0.941 
Complete 
secondary 
1.632 2.164 -0.684 0.721 -0.635 1.469 0.14 0.963 
Incomplete 
secondary 
1.134 2.475 0.767 0.828 0.648 1.68 0.823 1.106 
Age 30-39 3.274*** 1.12 0.485 0.374 1.31 0.76 0.83 0.5 
40-49 2.481** 1.161 -0.365 0.387 0.111 0.788 0.104 0.52 
50-59 3.716*** 1.143 0.101 0.382 1.446 0.776 0.922 0.51 
>60 3.96*** 1.113 0.807 0.371 2.085*** 0.756 1.286*** 0.498 
Village 2.93*** 1.225 0.172 0.41 -0.811 0.832 0.696 0.549 
Very small 
city 
1.286 1.704 -0.84 0.568 -3.735*** 1.157 1.308** 0.761 
Small city 7.167*** 2.028 1.008 0.676 1.671 1.377 3.377 0.903 
Medium-sized 
city (20–99K) 
0.414 1.25 -0.187 0.418 -1.203 0.849 0.677 0.56 
Large city 
(100–499K) 
4.176*** 1.189 0.948 0.397 0.366 0.807 0.703 0.533 
Enough 
money for 
food but not 
clothes 













1.439 1.884 0.526 0.628 -2.092 1.279 -0,918 0,84 
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Models with the general attitude dependent variable have the highest R2=0.43 in 
average, which is practically the same that Barrington and Faranda (2009) had. Moreover, 
almost all coefficients which are significant in their baseline model were also significant in 
our model with this variable. In second place are the models with the preferable foreign 
policy direction dependent variable — R2 is nearly 0.4. The other models are substantially 
less explanatory: R2≤0.2. 
The following table represents changes in regional structure influence, if we include 
regional lingual-ethnic heterogeneity. All other predictors for the corresponding datasets 
are the same. 
Table 2. OLS Regression Coefficient Estimates with lingual-ethnic heterogeneity 
inclusion. 
 April 2005 poll. Dependent variable: Which 
relations with Russia do you prefer? (the value 
changes from -10 to 10) 
Crimea -2,946 0,776 
Percentage of russians 0,174*** 0,013 
 April 2008 poll. Dependent variable: What is your 
general attitude to Russia now? (the value changes 
from -10 to 10) 
Crimea -5,19*** 0,706 
Percentage of russians 0,227*** 0,018 
 April 2014 poll. Dependent variable: index 
“General attitude to Russia” (the value changes 
from -40 to 40) 
Model 1 
Eastcentral region 1,749 1,148 
Percentage of russians 1,402*** 0,089 
Model 2 
South region 1,908 1,282 
Westcentral 2,188 1,347 
Percentage of Ukrainian language 




Westcentral 2,067 1,242 
Percentage of bilingual-speaking 
ethnic Ukrainians 0,252*** 0,056 
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Model 4 
South region 2,382 1,271 




Eastcentral region -8,064*** 1,178 
South -5,032*** 1,308 
Northcentral -7,278*** 1,034 
Westcentral 2,676 1,389 




Eastcentral region -7,756*** 1,172 
South -4,331*** 1,3 
Percentage of Russian language 
speakers 
0,298c 0,019 
 Dependent variable: Which relations with Russia 
do you prefer? (the value changes from -10 to 10) 
Model 1 
Eastcentral region 0,45 0,383 
Percentage of russians 0,28*** 0,03 
Model 2 
South region -0,401 0,427 
Northcentral -0,333 0,33 
Westcentral 0,829 0,449 




South region -0,304 0,424 
Northcentral -0,153 0,326 




Eastcentral region -1,507*** 0,392 
South -1,696*** 0,437 




Eastcentral region -1,446*** 0,39 
South -1,556*** 0,434 
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Percentage of Russian language 
speakers 
0,059*** 0,006 
 Dependent variable: Do you prefer Customs 
Union with Russia or European Union? (the value 
changes from -10 to 10) 
Model 1 
South region -0,129 0,575 




South region 0,134 0,57 
Southwest 1,762 0,808 




Eastcentral region -1,705*** 0,525 
South -1,549*** 0,586 




Eastcentral region -1,57*** 0,522 
South -1,243** 0,583 




The key message we should take from these regression tables is that lingual-ethnic 
heterogeneity is definitely one of the deeper level explanatory variables of the on-surface 
regional cleavages in geopolitical orientations. Although the effects of lingual-ethnic 
groups proportions are not very powerful, they are all highly significant and, what is more 
important, change regional effects estimates. Those effects become insignificant, change 
their direction (sign), or both. This tendency is especially true for the South-East half of 
Ukraine. Unlike previous models with only separate effects of regional structure and 
lingual-ethnic identity, these estimates are explanatory for all types of geopolitical 
orientations we consider. 
Still there are some peculiarities in each model worth considering: 
 The effect of a small fraction of Ukrainians in Crimea diminishes the separate 
effect of living in that region in relation to attitudes on integration. Crimean 
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ethnic Ukrainians favor eurointegration. This tendency is noticeable throughout 
the decade from 2005-2015 (joint 2005-2015 dataset). The smaller measurement 
points (2005 and 2008 year datasets) show this tendency for Russians, but 
obviously indicating the opposite direction. 
 The effect of the proportion of Ukrainian speaking ethnic Ukrainians in Crimea, 
Eastcentral, South, Southwest, and Northcentral regions diminishes the separate 
effect of living in these regions, if we consider the joint dataset. At the same time, 
the effect of the proportion of Ukrainian speaking ethnic Ukrainians is observed 
only in East and South regions. 
 The Ukrainian language speakers’ proportion makes insignificant the separate 
effect of living in Crimea, Eastcentral, South, Southwest, and Northcentral 
regions. The same effect of Russian-speaking percentage is present in Crimea, 
Eastcentral, and South regions only. 
While comparing three periods of Ukrainian political history after 2005, we note the 
following peculiarities: 
 During the Yushchenko and Yanukovych presidencies, the tendencies of lingual-
ethnic heterogeneity influence are essentially the same. The exceptional is only 
the model which takes into account the percentage of Russian-speaking 
Ukrainians. During the years 2005-2009, the separate place of residence predictor 
in South region is insignificant, while between 2010 and 2013 — it is lower. 
 After 2014, the estimated coefficients of regions should be considered, while 
taking into account the absence of Crimea in the samples. Therefore, certain 
transformation of the regional scale of geopolitical orientations can be seen. 
Especially noticeable is the Southwest region, where lingual-ethnic groups’ 
distribution diminishes the residence effect in the majority of models.  
Discussion 
The significance of the coefficients in the joint dataset may be an answer to 
Barrington’s and Faranda’s (2009) claim: “Another question for further study involves 
whether or not the weak interaction effects were the product of large standard errors as 
much as weak effects” (p. 251). They used a dataset composed of 1200 cases, while part 
of our dataset with data valid for analysis comprised more than 120,000 cases. The lower 
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explanatory power of the models with the integration attitude index may be explained by 
peculiarity of this attitude when compared to the general sentiment. 
This assumption was confirmed with the analysis of single datasets, especially the 
April 2014 survey, which had the most complete block of questions available for the 
calculation of the attitude index. This set of predictors provides the best explanation 
regarding the general attitude towards Russia. Geopolitical orientations about real foreign 
policy actions towards different unions, especially if this unions mean loose of Ukrainian 
sovereignty, may be better explained with some other predictors. We suggest as one of 
these predictors, satisfaction with Ukrainian government policy in different spheres, 
especially the meeting of Russophones’ cultural needs. 
At the same time, combined indexes, which allow the capturing of consistent favor 
towards one of the geopolitical poles, are better explained. The answers to single questions 
are more dispersed. This suggests that structural influence should be preferably analyzed 
with the use of carefully calculated indexes, rather than single variables like voting 
preferences on the referendum. 
Coefficients of living in Crimea and Eastern regions suggest that Russian speakers of 
Eastern regions are more supportive to a union with Russia than Crimean people. 
Barrington’s results for these two regions were quite opposite. The difference may be 
explained, in our opinion, by three factors: (1) the pro-Ukrainian role of Crimean Tartars, 
based on the decade surveys turn out to be more salient; (2) absence of Crimea in the 
survey samples after it was annexed by Russia; (3) radicalization of the Eastern region in 
the integration attitude dimension after 2005, especially after military conflict started in 
the region in 2014. 
The assumption about the possible explanation of regional differences by social 
environment, namely lingual-ethnic domination of certain groups, is partially confirmed. 
In general, it seems that language environment has more influence than ethnic. Still, there 
are other variables with values across regions that may be part of the puzzle. One of them 
is religious identification which remains very powerful and significant. This suggests that 
the cultural domain of social environment is the key to explaining regional structures of 
geopolitical orientations in Ukraine. By “cultural domain,” we mean the main 
humanitarian differences of West-Central and East-South parts of Ukrainian societies: 
spoken language, ethnic self-identification, and their combinations, social values, 
confessional affiliation. Some of these variables go beyond the scope of this study, thus 
they are to be considered in further research. 
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It must be noted that socio-cultural and orientation cleavages between two parts of 
Ukraine are the prerequisites for the conflict and their social background, but not the 
triggers and direct causes of the military action. Other political, economic, and subjective 
(personal influence of certain stakeholders) factors, both internal and external, took their 
turn in transforming disagreement into separatists movements.  
Regional elites of south-eastern Ukraine sought control over other regions of the 
country, but because of the Euromaidan, they faced the threat of losing influence even in 
Donbass (Skvorets, 2015). Eastern Ukraine over the past decades had a parallel 
government system, popularly called “oligarkhat” (“oligarch ruling”). The 2010-2013 
period was marked by the attempt of eastern oligarchic elites to expand their control on 
the territory of the whole country. By using politically motivated appointments (mostly of 
people from Donbass: Donetsk and Luhansk regions) to senior positions in regional units 
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Security Service of Ukraine, prosecutors, tax, customs 
and justice officials, they subordinated regional business and political elites, and co-opted 
them into the political structure of the Party of Regions (Piechal, 2015). The success of 
this tactic in various regions was different. In western regions, it did not lead to an 
appreciable success, but on the contrary, has become one of the main reasons of the 
Euromaidan and its mass support among the residents of the western regions of country. 
In Crimea, this tactic led to the actual capture of this autonomous region by oligarchic 
groups so-called “Macedonians” (people of Makiivka and Donetsk origin) and removal of 
the local elite from regional executive government institutions (Fisun, 2015). The latter 
was among the most recent causes of Crimean people growing discontent with Ukrainian 
central government, ultimately led to popular support of Russian annexation. 
This rough Donbass-centered policy of Yanukovych government eventually led to 
the formation of separatist paramilitary groups in Eastern Ukraine, when Euromaidan 
clashes in Kyiv became bloody violent. Starting from Kharkiv “Oplot” organization 
members, their supporters claimed that a paramilitary coup d’etat had happened in Kyiv 
(Kuzio, 2015; Laruelle, 2015). From the Donbass people’s point of view their 
representative overthrow looked absolutely unlawful and intolerable. The position of 
Donbass regional elites was somewhat different: they wanted to use separatist movements 
to bargain with new Kyiv authorities, claiming to preserve their exclusive status 
(Golovakha, 2014). After Russia’s intrusion, when the unrest in Donbass transformed into 
the Ukraine-Russia conflict, oligarchs retrieved to Kyiv, leaving the region under the 
control of paramilitary groups’ commanders and Russian emissaries (Piechal, 2015). 
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Conclusion 
As a result of replication of Barrington and Faranda’s approach on the datasets of 
different periods, scale, dependent single-question variables and combined indexes, we 
can confirm that on the individual level of analysis “region of residence” is a key 
explanatory variable of geopolitical orientations. Still, the regional structure is more 
powerful in explaining the general attitude to Russia than integration intentions. Also, our 
analysis suggests that the Donbass region is more radical and solid if we take its pro-
Russian population fraction, even compared to Crimea. 
Using lingual-ethnic heterogeneity, predictors in regression models challenge 
previously dominated view of residence place as the key and inseparable predictor of 
geopolitical orientations in Ukraine. It is worth moving in the direction of studying wider 
cultural heterogeneity of the regions. It is an object of change unlike region boundaries, 
which are established administratively. Thus these predictors expected to be more valuable 
for prognosis than the rigid regional structure. 
In further research, it may be valuable to include other control variables, like 
government policy satisfaction, and use more consistent orientation indexes. A 
qualitatively upper level of results may be achieved, if we move from analyzing individual 
respondents’ answers to macro-characteristics of the regions (not upper than oblast level). 
That is regions must be considered as cases in model calculations, and aggregated 
indicators (proportion of ethno-lingual groups, level of urbanization etc.) as predictor 
variables in regression. In that case, we could explain the essence of a regional structure 
influence, which can only be postulated from individual level regression models. 
In this article, we considered internal social prerequisites of the military conflict in 
Ukrainian South-East: for at least ten years Ukrainian society was, in fact, divided into two 
almost conflicting parts, mainly on a regional basis. The most pro-Russian sentiments were 
widespread in Crimea and eastern Ukraine—Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The main 
reasons of such geopolitical orientations differences are of cultural origin: language, 
ethnicity, values, and confessional affiliation. However, transformation of this 
disagreement into military conflict needed the confluence of a number of internal and 
external factors: Donbass-centered policy of Yanukovych government, Euromaidan, 
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